

STATE OF OREGON  
DEPARTMENT OF GEOLOGY & MINERAL INDUSTRIES  
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# THE ORE.-BIN

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THE SMALL MINER - FINISH!

There's an old time miner's song that begins, "Oh, the miners came in forty-nine..." and with occasional reference to strong drink and indelicate women, it carries on through several stanzas with the lilt, lingo, and lurid deviltry of an early day gold camp. It isn't a song one sings in mixed company, but it goes big at engineers' stag smokers. The writer, as a cub engineer, first heard it on the Mesabi and Michigan iron ranges many years ago. In the last dozen years, since living in the west, we've heard the song more often. It's the same old song, not altered a hair; but its heroes, the miners - Lawd, how dey's changed!

More than once in very recent years - since the coming of OPA, and WFA, and WPB, and ODT, and PAW, and WMC, and the other oft-damned, trinomial contrivances - the writer has paused by the trail into Sailor Diggins or some other fabulous gold strike locality, and tried to re-create in his mind the conditions that brought fame to the spot. Like as not some sourdough got "likkered up" and talked about his find. There was a stampede. And, brother, in those days, whether the stampede was across forty or four hundred miles of country, the miners were not deterred one whit by prohibition or act, natural or otherwise, of God or man - least of all by any such unborn innovations as gas rationing, job freezing, tire shortages, food coupons, high labor rates, directives, quotas, limitations, priorities, fear of income taxes, or by any other of the present day impediments to the exercise of private enterprise. We've tried deliberately to conjure up a picture of these old-time miners, mentioned in the song, negotiating for a copper quota; being told by an RFC engineer how to run their diggings; trying to get a priority on drill steel; quibbling with a ration board about gas, tire, and food rations; paying most of the gold from a bonanza find in income taxes; making out old age compensation forms; or being told by a "callow collegian" in the War Manpower Commission that they are frozen to their jobs and can't go down the trail whenever they goddam please. We can't picture them. You try it.

If the essence of this yarn is the passing of the small miner, let's try to be logical and dispassionate, and see whether he was any good in the beginning - whether he is worth keeping. If not, then let's bury him - with his boots on as he would have liked; if he IS worth keeping, let's carry on with all vigor to set the stage for his triumphant return as soon as the present terrible conditions are over.

They say that the early day miner with his pick, pan, sow-belly, and burro "made" the west, that is, the so-called western mining states. We don't know; no one can prove the point as an engineer would prove a mathematical formula. But it's certain that sourdough prospectors, gold miners and other miners had a lot to do with the moving about, hither and yon, of quite sizeable chunks of population - as when word of a new Klondike, or Comstock, or Alder Gulch, or "find" on the Mother Lode, travelled along the grapevine. And how many thriving communities between the Mississippi and the Sierra Nevadas germinated from a few stragglers that fell by the wayside on their trek toward a gold fortune in California around the middle of the last century? The number is legion.

The old time miners were individualists; each went about his business in his own way; each knew exactly what he wanted. There was little indecision; in fact, there was much truth in the saying about "the quick and the dead"; as evidence, read the ages on tombstones in many of the old "Boot Hill" cemeteries from southern Oregon to the southern Mother Lode. In those days there was sound basis for individual initiative - there was real incentive - incentive to work hard and if necessary to take personal risks. The race was what one made it and the reward was ample if one "struck it". We hear you say facetiously to us, "Then how would you like to swap the present for the past, and go back to those 'good old days' when men were men, when women wore dresses, when price had some relation to a willing buyer and a willing seller, when....?" Of course, we'd hedge a minute before answering, but we'd say quickly that, whatever you may think of those good old days of the dim past, the present set-up in mining leaves a whole Hell of a lot to be desired.

But, through the years, conditions have changed for the small miner. (By small miner we mean from single prospector to little "mine" with three or four workmen.) In the early days the individual miners formed groups for protection against Indians, thieves, and racketeers; a little later, as the ores became leaner or the mines went beyond windlass depth, miners formed associations and companies in order to make the diggings pay. Such groups, at least some of them, were the beginnings of some of the big-name mining corporations and bonanza operations that are known today. So even the large mining corporations owe a debt to the small miner. As a rule, they encourage the little fellow to carry on. At one time or another, miners go prospecting on their own. They sometimes find little mines and some of the little mines make big ones. When pickings are slim the small miner and prospector frequently go back to work at the established mines, and the mine operators are pleased with this arrangement. It has been an adage that prospectors and miners "find" mines, but that engineers and the larger mining companies "make" the mines. Regardless of who "made" them, it probably is true that most of the hard rock, precious metal mines were discovered by the small miner or prospector.

Various persons have said, in effect, "The bonanzas have all been found; the prospector and small miner are through; mines in the near future will mainly be 'developed' by the larger companies from the marginal deposits or from 'big low grades', or on technology, where the little fellow hasn't a chance." We agree that the trend is definitely in that direction; that the "good little mine" is becoming harder and harder to find, and that the very great bulk of all mineral and ore production comes, and will continue to come, from the larger mines. But we will fight 'till Hell freezes solid for the small miner or prospector who has the guts, or the stupidity, or the cunning, or the asininity, or the clairvoyance, or the inspiration, or whatever it takes to drive with main strength and awkwardness, and at his own expense, a drift that the writer as a supposedly competent engineer might not recommend that his client drive. Inconsistent, you say? Not at all. The congenital and infeasible right of every American citizen - acting on the profit motive - to make a damn fool or a millionaire of himself by poking a tunnel into any hill on free range where his fancy dictates, is, in the writer's opinion, the very essence of free enterprise, which in turn is the essence of Americanism. If that isn't worth standing up for, then we had better try to give the whole business back to the Indians. Private enterprise and the profit incentive built this country, and when anyone, any group, agency, or entity tries to repress the operation of these two basic American concepts, the motives of such persons or groups should be meticulously scrutinized.

About this last-of-the-bonanza matter - we recall hearing in recent years from the lips of one of the Holmes brothers the story of the finding and developing of the famous Silver Queen mine near Mojave, California, by himself and three partners. When the news got around the property was promptly sold for a million dollars to one of the largest gold companies, the small miners profiting hugely. A few other instances of the last ten years could be cited. The person who thinks that all the bonanzas have been found does not take into consideration extensive areas of potential mineralized ground in the mountainous and inaccessible corners of the West.

As to the small miner's worth, he is very much a part of the local economy in a mining community. Through the years he has been buying his grub and supplies from the local stores. In 1938 a statistical survey was made in the Grants Pass, Oregon, community to determine what the small miners' dollars meant in retail stores. When the results of a canvass of 80% of the establishments were footed up, the total (well over \$600,000.) was so large the canvass was discontinued. It was thought that the public would receive any such amazing figure with skepticism. Even so, many thousands of dollars in cash purchases by miners were omitted from the figures, as there was no separate record or segregation of them.

There are a few mineral products to which the small miner's style of operation is particularly adapted. Mica is one of these. It comes in small bunches and "pockets" and is therefore mainly a small miner's proposition. Hard rock chromite is another. Quicksilver is a third. Almost invariably, quicksilver mines are discovered by prospectors by panning and "pocket hunting". A smart miner can make a "shoestring getaway" by cobbing out and retorting high-grade quicksilver ore. Sometimes one turns up a property where a furnace must be installed. That requires financing and a technical operation beyond the ability of most small miners. However, the actual and total contribution of the prospector and small miner to the mining industry is out of all proportion to the dollar value of his product in comparison with the industry total. That fact is too commonly forgotten.

As to whether the prospector and small miner are worth saving - no one except the least informed has any doubt. They are. If for no other reason than their past record and contributions, the little fellows, as an institution, are worthy of their niche in the hall of the immortals. In the war effort, they have in their way responded as well proportionately as the big fellows, although under great difficulties.

Granted that the small miner has earned his "keep", let's follow him rapidly through the last twenty years, study his habits a bit, and try to figure a way of getting him back as soon as possible.

In the early "20's" he did rather well. Times were average, wages were average, and prices of metals were average. In the late "20's" mining incentive, in the form of higher prices for ores or metals, became more evident, but both wages and cost of supplies went up proportionally. However, as most people had money to invest and wanted really quick action, they put their money largely in securities, the day-to-day prices of which they could watch in the newspapers. Nevertheless, money for small mining was ample, so the prospector and small miner thrived.

Then came the crash of 1929, almost everybody lost money; security and metal prices hit bottom. Much of the incentive for small mining vanished, except in the case of gold. Gold saved the day. We have seen ex-bankers, ex-brokers, ex-bond-salesmen, and ex-almost-everything working with pick, shovel, and rocker or long tom on the gold streams in various parts of the west. These people stayed off relief and, as they put it, retained every iota of their self-respect as well as their health. The sight of a man, obviously a former executive, professional man, or technician, swapping a few penny-weights of gold dust for pancake flour, beans, salt pork, and tobacco in a wayside store in the gold country, gave an observer a bit of insight into a corner of the true American character, and revived one's faith in it. That kind of character just won't be licked. The seasoned sourdough helped the greenhorn; some mutual respect was developed, no one starved.

In 1935 the price of gold was upped to \$35. per fine ounce, and that acted as a tremendous stimulant both to big and small gold operations. Then came the early years of World War II - 1938, 1939, and 1940. It was plain that in the event of the United States' getting into it, the country would be woefully short of reserves of a considerable list of so-called strategic ores. Should we develop limited and sub-marginal domestic deposits, or buy foreign ores? The Federal buying agencies preferred the cheaper and higher-grade foreign ores. The larger domestic consumers did, too, for some of them had substantial foreign holdings. So the Federal



agencies called for bids. Some contracts were let, but precious little ore was delivered. Domestic operators, mainly little fellows, were out of the running with few exceptions. Metals Reserve Company began raising the price of strategic ores a little in the late summer of 1941 but only on substantial contract deliveries. The small chrome and manganese producers were suspicious of contracts, and couldn't finance production facilities to meet the contracts anyway.

The jolt of Pearl Harbor left the small miners - such as the chrome operators of northern California and southern Oregon - anxious to produce strategic ores. They were just fit to be tied. The going ore prices were too low to permit them to produce. They thought the government wasn't interested in their small contributions. In late February 1942 Metals Reserve Company agreed to the establishment of the first four stockpiles for the local purchase of chromite in truck-load lots direct from small miners and prospectors. In May those purchase depots got going. Since that time, similar local strategic-ore purchase depots have been installed in various parts of the country from North Carolina to the west coast.

Neither the Metals Reserve Company nor the sponsors of the local stockpile idea (which included the writer) anticipated that the tonnages of ores to be delivered by the small operators would be tremendous. It was believed however that the nuisance and cost of purchasing the ores would be well compensated by the favorable effect on both miner and citizen morale in all parts of the mining country, and that the strategic ores purchased, depending on the then-increasing submarine menace, might have value out of all proportion to the effort of obtaining them. The submarine menace finally diminished, but otherwise the local purchase-depot program worked out about as expected. The small miners and prospectors hit for the hills. And were they proud when telling of getting out a few tons of high-grade chromite - enough to alloy the steel for a couple of tanks or a dozen airplanes!

But no sooner did the government make it possible for the small miner to make his contribution to the war effort in certain sections of the mining country than outside influences began to cramp his style. First came the matter of priorities. Mine operators had to rate as going concerns, "necessary to the war effort", or they could get little relief in buying supplies, repairs and replacements. Usually they couldn't. WPB encouraged the big operators, discouraged the little ones (not alone in mining). When the small miner had enough of an operation to rate a serial number under P-56, he was plagued by confusing and endless forms to fill out, and by exasperating delays in obtaining supplies and repairs.

Next came rubber and gasoline rationing. These put a further "crimp" in the small miner and prospector who couldn't readily get tires for rough mountain roads. Then came food rationing. He couldn't go to the stores and freely buy staple groceries for his camp. Through all this the small miner (and others not so small) was saying, in effect, "Who in turnation is running my mine? Am I or some crackpot in Washington who knows nothing but paperwork? Does the government really want these strategic ores anyway?" (How many times has the writer been asked these questions!) The stories of difficulties, heartaches, delays, and hindrances to the war efforts of the small mining operators that came as a result of alleged stupidity and lack of understanding of mining and local conditions by government personnel kept coming from all directions. It was impossible to convince small miners that WPB was trying impersonally to rate strategic mineral operations in proportion to their calculated value to the war effort. Under that formula - justified by WPB because of war exigencies - the small miner didn't rate, whereas the large operators did.

Then, in the fall of 1942, WPB threw out gold mining all over the country. That knocked the last stull from under the small miner and prospector, who could always make beans if necessary on a gold stream. It took his hole card; left him bare to the breezes.

To those small mine operators who stuck to strategic minerals through patriotism or virtual necessity, the going became harder and harder because of the loss of labor to high pay jobs in the shipyards and other war industries. It became almost impossible to get men

to haul ore, cut timber, and do mechanical and road work. In the mining country there were left, for the most part, only the quite old men and the partially disabled. Small and prospecting virtually ceased, and that is the present situation.

From the beginning WPB has taken the attitude that it could not gamble on war mineral production, that it must encourage the larger operations because of their higher efficiency - more tons-per-man, their greater "know-how", their better organization, their financial competency, and because most of them had known ore reserves. So the larger operations got the priorities on materials and supplies, also the labor - that which did not leave for higher pay jobs. It might be remarked that the large companies were in a position to look after their own interests in various ways in Washington, whereas, the individual small miner could not. Although against overwhelming odds, a very few members of Congress from mining states, and, conspicuously, the small miners association in Arizona, kept alive in Washington the cause of the small mine operator.

What does the after-the-war picture look like, as it may affect the small miner and prospector? Let's make some prophecies. Most manufacturing and the bulk of the production of minerals and ores will be, more than ever, concentrated in the larger operating companies for they are in a position to consolidate the gains of various kinds they have made within the emergency period. The larger companies are 'in' and can't get out; the little fellows are out and can't get in, or don't want in. The larger companies, better than any other group, may put into effect after the war new manufacturing techniques, new production "wrinkles" and new research discoveries, all of which should have a bearing on a company's ability to survive; they should also be in better position to protect themselves against adverse trends such as regimentation, excess government interference, high taxes, difficult labor relations, and increasingly difficult competition. Wages, and therefore supplies and facilities, will probably be relatively high in cost; whereas the price of metals, except gold, will be relatively lower in price as compared with present quotations. The prices of metals will go down considerably before the costs of the labor and supplies decline. Speaking generally, the trend seems toward continuing government controls of various kinds with lessening of local controls and less freedom of individual action.

Most important, any way one looks at it, is the fading away of our good, old-fashioned things called "free enterprise" and "private initiative" and "profit motive". The "enterprise" isn't free any more. It's held back by a combination of anchors such as special regulations, and directives, and ceilings, and limitations of various kinds. Private initiative has become much subdued because the incentive has diminished; freedom of action has been curtailed by various restrictions. And the profit motive....well, we have the motive left, but not the profit.

The dream of prospectors and small miners since the beginning has been the making of a strike - of becoming wealthy over night, of having money with which to buy whatever the heart desires, money to provide for decent and comfortable old age. Now, even the most backward prospector in a remote mountain cabin knows that, if he should hit the jackpot, income taxes would take away most of his winnings. He never heard of the economic law of vanishing returns but his lessened activity demonstrates the law. He feels that a penalty has been placed on pioneering - and he's right.

Again, gold in the after-the-war period holds forth some attraction to the small miner and prospector, but on the whole the future for him is certainly not bright. If a stockpiling law is passed to maintain, for a time, production of domestic minerals that can be produced by the small operators, the latter will carry on and prosper - if some of the present restrictions and impediments imposed by the government can just be lifted. Stockpiling of ores for future emergency consumption is sound if properly planned and carried out. The idea must be woven into a plan for the encouragement of production of the scarce domestic ores. Congress should be smart enough to see that domestic production of deficiency ores, while probably uneconomic in peace time, may make sense nevertheless and should be encouraged.

It is common sense to subsidize, if necessary, investigation, production, and accumulation of deficiency ores in peace time, rather than wait until a war catches us and then subsidize them on the spur of the moment, when every other facility we have is taxed to the limit. But matters don't always go according to logic. Both the large company consumers of critical materials that were coming from foreign sources and the government itself were guilty of letting us go far beyond the danger point in this war emergency before putting in effect adequate measures to try to produce similar or substitute domestic materials for the war effort. During that 'guilty period' the small miners and prospectors, wanting to get in and pitch, were shouting their heads off; now, they are silent - too hungry to shout. Later, we hope they come back and go into the hills with joy in their hearts, but.....

Meantime, "Adios, old timers." .....Anyway, "Hasta la vista."

E.K.N.

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#### WPB REVISES MINERALS POLICY

The War Production Board issued a statement October 27, 1943, reviewing the Board's action restricting marginal mineral production. The Board has acted because of three changed factors in the mineral production program, these being increased mineral production, revised military requirements and a greater need for marginal manpower than for marginal minerals.

The chief methods of conserving manpower in mineral production have been:

- (1) Allocating soldiers who have been released to the Enlisted Reserve Corps (as well as other labor) under a system of mine labor priorities.
- (2) Conserving the use of critical materials and equipment, and production of which requires labor, and
- (3) Utilizing manpower in the mining industry in such a manner as to produce the required amount of minerals with the minimum number of men. By these means, labor can be most effectively employed to attain the goals of the "must programs".

Accordingly, the following actions have been taken:

- (1) The Production Executive Committee has decided that after stockpiles of ferro-alloys (vanadium, tungsten, molybdenum, cobalt, etc.) reach recommended levels, domestic production and imports will be kept in balance with the then current consumption. This will insure a supply of ferro-alloys adequate to meet the needs of the war and avoid excessive accumulations which would be costly both in dollars and manpower. In this connection, arrangements have been made for reducing the government purchases of certain ferro-alloy minerals.
- (2) Premium prices in the B range have been denied to lead mines not already operating, and to lead mines having a low labor productivity and located in areas in which there is serious shortage of labor.
- (3) Premium prices in the B and C ranges have been denied to zinc mines not already operating, and to zinc mines having a low labor productivity and located in areas in which there is serious shortage of labor.
- (4) The Government is not now financing new zinc projects.
- (5) It has been determined that no new government purchase contracts should be entered into for the import of chemical chromite, vanadium and cobalt.
- (6) Operations in low-grade chrome mines in Montana are to be put in standby condition and labor is to be diverted to mines producing more critically needed minerals.
- (7) Contracts with the larger domestic graphite companies are to be canceled; the mines of these companies are to be held in a state of readiness for the duration of the war and no more graphite is to be stocked by them.

(8) Domestic production and imports of mercury for the year 1944 for both private and government purchase are each to be reduced to approximately 70 percent of the 1943 amount.

(9) The production of bauxite in Arkansas by the three major producers is being sharply cut.

These administrative actions have been called for by the need to direct national effort to attain maximum over-all output in an all-out war. The Mineral Resources Operating Committee is periodically reviewing each mineral to determine the supply rate that should be planned in order to meet requirements and stockpile objectives. Administrative action will be taken from time to time on specific cases to meet these objectives and in keeping with the basic minerals and manpower policies established by the Congress and the President, and the directives issued by the Chairman and the Executive Vice Chairman of the War Production Board.

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#### THEY SAID

The history of the several efforts which have been made to get preliminary plants for the production of alumina from clay into existence is a record of delay and disappointment. Although such development should have been started more than 2 years ago, it has not yet begun, and there is no evidence as of this hour to indicate it ever will be begun on a scale that will insure national security of an aluminum supply in the face of any war reverses.

From speech by Hon. Harris Ellsworth of Oregon on "The Aluminum Situation" delivered in the House of Representatives, October 27, 1943.

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I doubt if the mortality rate in legitimate mining enterprises is any greater than in farming, manufacturing, railroading or any other field. I feel sincerely that to view mining as a part of a matured economy is to court disaster. To depend alone upon a centralized governmental control of development of natural resources is to sacrifice the spirit of endeavor which is our heritage from the founding fathers.

Allan S. Richardson, Securities Commissioner, State of Colorado, speech before The National Association of Securities Commissioners, as quoted in Mining Congress Journal, October, 1943.

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I believe that mining requires more courage than any other occupation. It is like shooting in the dark from one round to another, for one cannot see inside the Mother Earth. An individual who opens up a prospect requires courage and vision. That is why we must encourage new miners and render geological, metallurgical, and mining help - as well as financial aid when advisable.

A. C. D. in Deco Trefoil, October, 1943.

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A time there was when coin everywhere freely circulated on the basis of its weight and fineness. Regardless of mintage, whether pistole or guinea, louis, florin or thaler, it was placed on the scales, its weight and value determined, and it crossed all borders with no questions raised because all knew that an ounce of gold or an ounce of silver still weighed 480 grains on either side of any frontier. Here, then, was genuine "monnaie courante," which all understood and all accepted, east and west, rich and poor alike, each with the medium best suited to his needs. If that system worked, and work it did, why not restore it?

"Go Back to Hard Money Which is What the People Want" by Rene Leon in Mining and Contracting Review, September 30, 1943.

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The luncheon was addressed by Brig. Gen. Ray Hays, Adjutant General of California, who urged the mining industry to exert every effort toward a decentralization of government. General Hays traced the development of our present bureaucratic centralization over a period of 20 years and laid much of the blame for the start toward present conditions upon the counties' willingness to shift their responsibilities upon the states and upon the latter's desires to seek Federal aid in order to avoid noticeable taxation. A return to the assumption of its own responsibilities by each political subdivision must take place before the threat of complete centralization is averted, General Hays warned.

Speech at meeting of Board of Governors, California Chapter, A. M. C., San Francisco, September 16, 1943. Mining Congress Journal, October, 1943.

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In 1942 (calendar year), 54 million ounces of silver were produced in the United States. The United States Treasury purchased 47.8 million ounces of the domestic silver, and during the first half of the year it bought also small quantities of foreign silver -- 14 million ounces. The Treasury's total purchases in 1942 were thus 62 million ounces. Actual gross industrial consumption (table 2) was estimated at 121 million ounces, most of which was obtained from imports or stocks.

In addition to industrial consumption, the Government itself consumed a large quantity of silver during 1942 in the manufacture of subsidiary coins. The precise figure is not available; in the fiscal year 1942 the quantity so consumed was 91 million ounces (including 12 million ounces of silver minted for foreign countries). Assuming that the same amount was minted in calendar year 1942, the total industrial and coinage consumption in that year was about 212 million ounces. Deficits were drawn from stocks, partly from those held by the Treasury and partly from the stock pile acquired by the Metals Reserve Company.

Thus far (through June) in 1943, both domestic production and imports have declined. Total requirements, however, are expected to be larger than in 1942. It has been estimated that the industrial consumption, both for strategic and nonessential products, will be from 159 to 169 million ounces, including about 30 million ounces for nonessential purposes. If coinage requirements in the calendar year 1943 should be the same as in the fiscal year 1942, namely 91 million ounces, the total requirements for industrial use and coinage would be somewhere between 250 and 260 million ounces. Even if all consumption for non-essential purposes were to be eliminated, it would still be necessary to draw on existing stocks for supplies.

From "Silver in Wartime" by staff of United States Tariff Commission published September, 1943.

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## THIS CHRISTMAS

THIS IS THE MOST SOBERING CHRISTMAS SINCE THE FIRST ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED FORTY-THREE YEARS AGO.

AT NO OTHER CHRISTMAS TIME HAVE THERE BEEN SO MANY ALLEGEDLY CIVILIZED NATIONS, WITH SO MANY MILLION SOLDIERS, ALL SO COMPLETELY EQUIPPED WITH WEAPONS OF DESTRUCTION, AND ALL SO HIGHLY AND SCIENTIFICALLY TRAINED IN THE BUSINESS OF MURDER, LOCKED IN DEADLY COMBAT ON SO MANY FRONTS.

NEVER BEFORE IN HISTORY HAVE SO MANY MILLION CIVILIANS IN THE WORLD BEEN GIVING THEIR DAILY EFFORTS, THEIR WORLDLY GOODS, THEIR INCOMES, AND THE NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS OF THEIR COUNTRIES - IN THE USELESS, DEGENERATE THING CALLED WAR.

THE LIE, IT SEEMS, IS GIVEN TO THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR CIVILIZATION, WHEN, WITH ALL OUR VAUNTED LOGIC, OUR SCIENCE, OUR CODES OF DECENCY AND OUR RELIGION, A CHECK IS NOT PROVIDED AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL ASCENDANCY OF AN AMBITIOUS MADMAN - SCHICKELGRUBER - THAT LED TO THE ULTIMATE MAELSTROM OF WORLD CONFLICT INTO WHICH WE HAVE BEEN CAST. THE CARNAGE OF THIS WAR IS AN EVEN GREATER CRIME AGAINST THE BASIC CONCEPT OF RELIGION THAN IT IS AGAINST THE ESSENCE OF CIVILIZATION. WE EXPECT MORE FROM RELIGIOUS TRAINING, BUT NOT FROM CIVILIZATION - JUDGING BY THE HISTORY OF PAST CENTURIES.

THEN WHERE DOES THE DIFFICULTY LIE? IS IT WITH RELIGION? NO.

THERE IS NOTHING EITHER IN THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION OR IN THE MEANING OF THE GOLDEN RULE OF HUMANITY THAT WOULD HAVE DETERRED THE COMBINED CIVIL RULERS OF EUROPE FROM TAKING SCHICKELGRUBER BY THE SCRUFF OF THE NECK AND SETTLING HIS CASE ABOUT 1937, IN THE LIGHT OF THE SINCE-DEMONSTRATED CRIME THAT WAS IN THE MADMAN'S HEART IN THOSE YEARS. THE TROUBLE ISN'T WITH RELIGION, IT'S WITH THAT QUIRK OF HUMAN NATURE THAT CAUSES MAN TO SHIRK RESPONSIBILITIES, TO TAKE THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTANCE, TO PROCRASTINATE.

LET'S HAVE MORE OLD-FASHIONED RELIGION, MORE COURAGE - AND MORE CHRISTMASES AS OF YORE, WITH PEACE AND GOOD WILL TO ALL MEN AS THE UNDERLYING SENTIMENT. THAT IS OUR PRAYER.

EARL K. NIXON AND THE STAFF OF  
THE OREGON DEPARTMENT OF GEOLOGY  
AND MINERAL INDUSTRIES

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